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ARTÍCULO DE REVISIÓN / REVIEW ARTICLE
Rev Neuropsiquiatr. 2022; 85(2): 107-116
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una Licencia Creative Commons
Atribución 4.0 Internacional.
¹ Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia. Lima, Perú,
² Mayo Clinic School of Medicine. Rochester, MN, USA,
³ Clínica Anglo Americana. Lima, Perú,
4 Universidad de Antioquia. Medellín, Colombia.
5 Universidad de Cuenca. Cuenca, Ecuador.
6 Latino Clínica. Cuenca, Ecuador.
7 Ponticia Universidad Javeriana. Bogotá, Colombia.
8 Clínica de la Mujer. Bogotá, Colombia.
a Psychiatrist, Master in Public Health. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7316-1185
b Psychiatrist. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-5615-2076
c Psychiatrist. ORCID ID: 0000-0003-1376-4782
d Psychiatrist, Magister in Higher Education. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-0735-4894
e Psychiatrist, Magister in Health Research. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-1718-8367
f Psychologist, Magister in Health Research. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6497-6518
g Psychiatrist. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6617-4121
Venezuelan Migration in Latin America: History
and sociodemographic aspects.
Migración Venezolana en América Latina: Historia y Aspectos Socio-Demográcos.
Renato D. Alarcón 1,2, a, Antonio Lozano-Vargas 1,3,b, Elvia Velásquez 4,c, Silvia Gaviria 4,d, José Ordoñez-
Mancheno 5,6,e , Miriam Lucio 5,f, Alina Uribe 7,8,g
SUMMARY
The migration of millions of Venezuelans to South American countries in the last two or three decades is one of
the most signicant social phenomena in the continent’s history. This article presents a brief historical account
of the process and describes a variety of dramatic aspects of the migrants’ experiences throughout the long road
towards Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and other countries. The main socio-demographic characteristics of the migrant
population (numbers, population types, geographic location in the host country, age, gender and civil status, work and
employment) in the above three countries, are described as a relevant basis of further inquiries on the repercussions
of migration on the mental health of its protagonists. The information covers important aspects of the journey and
the arrival as the initiation of a painful and uncertain process of acculturation and adaptation.
KEYWORDS: Migration, demography, host societies, acculturation.
RESUMEN
La migración de millones de venezolanos a países sudamericanos en las últimas dos o tres décadas constituye uno
de los fenómenos sociales más signicativos en la historia del continente. El presente artículo formula un breve
recuento histórico del proceso y describe odiseas de diversa naturaleza, experimentadas por los migrantes en el
Rev Neuropsiquiatr. 2022; 85(2): 107-116
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20453/rnp.v85i2.4228
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extenso recorrido hacia Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y otros países. Como base relevante de futuras investigaciones
en torno a repercusiones de la migración en la salud mental de sus protagonistas, se examinan las principales
características socio-demográcas (cifras, tipos de población, ubicación geográca en el país receptor, edad, género
y estado civil, trabajos y empleos) de los migrantes en Colombia, Ecuador y Perú. La información cubre aspectos
importantes de la travesía y el arribo que generan un doloroso e incierto proceso de aculturación y adaptación.
PALABRAS-CLAVE: Migración, demografía, sociedades antrionas, aculturación.
INTRODUCTION
The 21st Century has undoubtedly accentuated the
strength and the multiple impact of Globalization, a
process that, essentially, entails a pragmatic erasure
(or substantial modication) of frontiers and the
opening of ambiguous routes toward concepts like
“universal citizenship”, “diversity” or “identity” (1,2).
Technology and migrations are, in turn, prominent
epistemological pillars of Globalization (3): the
former, with primarily instrumental bases, supports
areas of communication, transportation, geographic
exploration, and scientic development (4); the latter,
characterized by mobilization and interactions, either
voluntary or obligated but always massive and intense,
of human groups until then distant from each other,
create new demographic, civic, political, economic
and socio-cultural realities (5).
Migrations have taken place from the beginning of
human history. The intense change of vital everyday
scenarios for migrants provokes intrapersonal and
interpersonal disturbances, confrontation with
conictive realities, and not always favorable outcomes
(6, 7). These experiences, lived for by migrants proper,
internal and external displaced people and refugees, do
have a critically relevant impact at individual, familial
and socio-political levels (3,4,5).
It is estimated that a little more than 4% of the
world population, approximately 280 million, is made
out of migrants, with a marked increase in the last
two decades (8). More than half of migrants are men,
almost 10% are refugees and, towards 2018, almost 50
million people were exclusively counted as internally
displaced, while the total of those considered displaced
(internal and external) reached a world level higher
than 80 million (9,10). Europe is the continent with
the highest number of migrants, followed by Asia
and North America; as far as countries is concerned,
United States occupies the rst place, followed by
Canada, Australia, Sweden, Norway, France, Spain
and England. The low and middle income countries
(LMICs) and the African continent do have the
highest proportions of refugees (86% of the total).
Furthermore, the persistent conicts between countries
of the Middle and Far East generate equally high
gures of displaced and refugees (11).
MIGRATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
In Latin America, the migratory phenomenon
shares in several of the characteristics noticed in other
continents. Throughout a long period, the migration
from Central American countries and Mexico towards
the United States has been the most dramatic and
intense; currently, it experiences a critical phase of
overcrowding in both sides of the border, family
separations, abandonment of children, the elderly and
women, with a background of interminable political
debates about its present and future management (12,
13).
During the rst half of the 20th. century, other
important migratory ows were recorded in Latin
America. Brazil received migrants from Japan and
Peru from China, whereas a majority of Italian and
Spanish migrants settled in Argentina. During the
60s, the mutual migration between countries of the
subcontinent did increase (14). As examples, a 12% of
Belize’s population comes from Central America and,
on the other hand, Chile provided residency visas to
275,000 Haitians in the last ten years (15), in addition
to its continuous reception of immigrants from Peru,
Ecuador and Colombia.
THE VENEZUELAN MIGRATION
From the beginning of this Century, another massive
migratory wave has triggered in Latin America, with
unique characteristics and a variety of implications,
both for the protagonists and for the inhabitants of
the host countries. Millions of Venezuelans have left
their country due to the socio- political uncertainties
generated by an authoritarian government, a notable
economic debacle (in a country considered by decades,
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particularly in the second half of the past century, as one
of the planet’s richest owed to its abundant petroleum
resources) and the subsequent scarcity of jobs, massive
poverty and collective malnutrition. The Venezuelan
Migration (MV) was initially mainly oriented, as
expected, to the neighboring countries in the Northern
part of the subcontinent (Colombia and Ecuador), and
has continued down towards the central, Southern
and Eastern areas, reaching currently Perú, Chile,
Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil. This article is the rst
of a series of four that will include specic inquiries
into the MV’s impact on mental health, eects of the
COVID-19 pandemic and migrant women’s response
to the experience. Its main purpose is to examine the
history and the evolvement of the VM, fundamentally
in three of the host countries: Colombia, Ecuador and
Perú. From this perspective, it will incorporate as far
as possible, reliable gures, socio-demographic and
economic characteristics of both, migrant and host
populations.
A BRIEF HISTORY
A study, conducted in Colombia, identies four
migratory waves coming from Venezuela in the last 20
years: the rst three, slow and of small numbers and
the latest, on the other hand, going beyond the most
serious predictions (16, 17). In February 1999, Hugo
Chavez Frias was elected President of Venezuela, and
gradually started a process of radical political changes
that, in turn, generated signicant economic variations
in all the population segments. Venezuela is, today,
one of the ten countries around the world with extreme
nutritional precariousness, scarcity of public services,
low general quality of life and very low levels of
health (18,19).
This process resulted in a sort of “selective
migration” with a rst wave, between 1999 and 2005,
mainly composed of members of high entrepreneurial
sectors, leaders and militants of opposing political
parties; the second, between 2005 and 2009, by
entrepreneurs, professionals and midline employees of
the petroleum industry as a result of the massive ring
from the state enterprise; the third, between 2010 and
2014 (Chavez died in 2013 and was succeeded by
Nicolas Maduro), constituted by professionals and
students of dierent disciplines and more middle
class people; and nally, the fourth wave, from
2015 up to now, an authentic diaspora, made out, in
its great majority by members of deprived and poor
communities, vulnerable people in desperate search of
surviving possibilities (17).
The rst phase of this migratory process had the
United States and Europe as its principal points of
destiny; the second, Colombia, Panamá. Dominican
Republic and other Caribbean countries, whereas the
two most recent phases, named “the migrations of
desperation” went towards Colombia, Ecuador, Peru
and Chile, in addition to those that attempted to reach
countries outside South America, mainly Central
America and the Caribbean region (Trinidad Tobago,
Aruba, and Curaçao) (20). The VM is, therefore, a
humanitarian crisis, a regional emergency that has
generated numerous international pronouncements,
response and management actions of diverse order.
Eleven countries of the region have dictated more
rigid measures to allow the admission of potential
Venezuelan migrants (21) which has produced, as
expected, a signicant increment of illegal migrants.
ODYSSEYS
Almost ve of the almost seven million people that
constituted the “fourth wave” (with an acme between
2017 and 2019), opted to seek residency in the three
Andean countries mentioned above: Colombia,
Ecuador and Perú. The journey of the great majority of
these migrants has been the nuclear factor of numerous
odysseys. It is not only the dramatic decision to
abandon their native country, break social groups and
family ties or face the unpredictable risks of cultural
uprooting, but also the frontal confrontation with an
uncertain fate as they were lacking in the most minimal
resources. The dierent migrant groups, small or big
and coming from dierent points, could coincide in
purposes and even in designing the route to follow,
but as they did not previously know each other, could
also constitute potential sources of heterogeneity,
discrimination, tensions, conicts and distress.
In Latin America, the great majority of Venezuelan
migrants displaced themselves by foot throughout
a good part of the route, carried their children and
very few belongings and, many times, their only
source of food and sustainability was the charity of
inhabitants of cities and towns along the way. Under
these conditions, the nutritional level of the migrant
population decreases signicantly, their sleep pattern
is disarticulated, discouragement gets bigger, and the
tensions are accentuated. At the climax, the physical
and mental health of these migrants suer enormous
consequences (22, 23).
As an example, the route from Venezuela to Perú
covers about 4,500 kilometers. According to a study
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from the Migration Policy Institute of the United States,
the journey lasts between one and 22 months, with an
average of 2 1/2 months (24). It is estimated that only
a 10% of those that cross the Rumichaca bridge, in the
province of Nariño at the Colombo-Ecuadorian border,
remain in Ecuador; the remaining continue towards
Tumbes in the Ecuador-Perú frontier before entering
the latter and, eventually, go on towards countries
in the Southern Cone of South America. Those who
decide to go to Brazil cross Colombia in successive
North- South and West-East segments passing forests
and rivers through the aggressive Amazonia (25).
That is why several of the initial components of
the experience in the host country constitute intense
challenges including, for instance, procedures
of formal registration, personal documentation,
place and condition (temporary or denitive) of
permanence, working possibilities, individual and
collective security, familiarization with public places,
socialization elements, linkage options, etc. (26, 27).
In the following pages, the main socio-demographic
characteristics of the VM process in Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru are examined on the basis of carefully
obtained and systematically evaluated information
from scientic publications and documents of public
and private agencies and oces. These characteristics
shape up the socio-cultural and emotional impact of
the process, which is the main objective of ongoing
inquiries and future publications of our research team.
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS
General characteristics
In 2020, Colombia kept on being the host country
with the highest number of Venezuelan migrants and
refugees, having accepted about 1,8 million, almost
one third of the total (28). The numbers may not
be exact due to the fact that not all the migrants are
registered and many, in fact, enter illegally into the
countries. In fact, it is estimated that in 2015 there were
approximately 200,000 Venezuelans in Colombia, but,
towards the third trimester of 2019, shortly before
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of
migrants had reached almost two million (29).
The Colombian government guarantees to the
migrants, independently of their status, the same rights
of access to health services (mental health included)
that applies to the country’s citizens. Currently,
however, only 10% of the migrants do have an active
health insurance in Colombia due to diculties in the
implementation of rules that would allow a formal
access to the system (18).
On its side, Ecuador shares with Venezuela a
series of historical and socio- cultural characteristics
within the so-called “Bolivarian Spirit”. Except for
two diplomatic conicts (in 1928 and 1955), the
relationship between these two countries has been
very cordial. Since 2010, the ux of migrants became
more pronounced and was even more intense at the
beginning of the 2015-2016 biennium. In the rst six
months of 2018, approximately 4,000 people were
daily entering the country, and the total number of
migrants was 954,217, 69% of whom entered Ecuador
with passport, and 30% with another personal identity
document. From the population in transit, the majority
between 18 and 35 years of age, 56% were men, 43%
women, and less than 1% LGBTQ people (30).
The economic situation of Ecuador, with the fall
of the petroleum price, adjustments and a 3% growth
of public expenditures have made it dicult an
adequate response of acceptance and protection to the
Venezuelan migrants, thus aggravating their problems
of mobility and their ght against discrimination and
xenophobia (31).
Occupying the second place after Colombia as
the nal destiny chosen by the migrants, Perú has not
been away from the type of social commotion that
the VM has produced in the continent. It is estimated
in almost 2 million, 92.6% of whom declared at the
time of entry that they were planning to reside in the
country, whereas 5.3% said that they would continue
their way down to Chile, 1.2% to Argentina, and 0.6%
to Bolivia. It is interesting that these gures, taken at
the time of entry through the border zone of Tumbes,
change when compared with the analyses from, for
example, the International Organization for Migrations
OIM, sigla in Spanish) which in 2018 reported a 23%
of migrants going through Peru in route to other
countries, particularly Chile (19%) and Argentina
(3%) (32). During 2019, an average of 1,235 migrants
were daily crossing the Ecuadorian- Peruvian border.
In February 2020, 60% were traveling with members
of their families and 35.6% did so, alone; 70.6% were
men and 29.4%, women, whereas 3.8% were part of
non-family groups composed by neighbors and/or
friends (33). On the other hand, the May 2021 report
indicated that at the place of destiny, 83% of the
migrants were counting on family support, 15% had
the support of friends, and 3% had a job oer (34).
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After the establishment of the humanitarian visa in
June 2019, the migratory ux descended considerably.
In 2020, there were 1,043,000 Venezuelan migrants
established in Peru, 500,000 of whom had requested
asylum. Although the displacements through regular
ways went down, the irregular mobilizations increased
since March 15, 2020, with the border closing,
mobility restrictions and the declaration of emergency
status due to the COVID-19 pandemic (28).
Types of migrant populations
The Venezuelan migrant population in Colombia
is formed by those that remain in the country, those
“in transit”, the “returned Colombians”, the children
of Venezuelan mothers born in Colombia and, last
but not least, the so-called “pendular population” of
Venezuelans that have a special permit, getting in and
out on a daily basis by crossing points of the 2,219
kilometers long Colombo-Venezuelan frontier to buy,
work or study and returning then to their housing
quarters in Venezuela. In 2019, it was estimated that
the total number of this population was 4’880,529
persons.
The “returned Colombians” that had migrated to
Venezuela during the period of violence in their country,
coinciding with the petroleum-based prosperity of
the latter, had double nationality and summed about
500,000 between 2015 and 2020. In the rst waves of
the VN, many returned quickly, constituting then up
to 75% of the migrants, whereas in 2019 they were
only 10% (35). On their side, up to February 2020, the
number of Colombian-born children of Venezuelan
mothers was calculated in 43,540. According to a
study of the Banco de la República, these children
were given the Colombian nationality in order not to
be left out as stateless (“apátrida”) and to have due
access to health services (35).
Even though it was initially thought that the
majority of migrants arriving in Ecuador would decide
to stay in the country, less than 25% have done so in the
last two years, and Ecuador has, then, been considered
more as a “passing by territory” towards Peru, Chile,
Argentina and other countries. Three fourths of the
migrants use the Colombo-Ecuadorian border point of
Rumichaca, and a close 72% the Huaquillas passing
towards Perú.
The monitorization of the Venezuelan migrant ux
towards Peru, through the city of Tumbes, conducted
by the OIM in May 2021, identied 38% of men and
17% of women travelling alone, 18% of lactation-
providing women, 13% of families with children
younger than 12, 5% of children separated from their
parents, 4% of pregnant women, and 3% of physically
disabled people (34).
Geographic location of Venezuelan migrants
The entry of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia takes
place in seven legally established points. According
to the World Bank, the migrants converge in border
zones (North of Santander, Araca and La Guajira)
(35). Later on, most migrants locate themselves in
cities and urban zones, somehow similar to those
of their native country. A 65% of migrants reside in
the 32 departmental capitals, and the remaining in
dierent municipalities across the country. About
1/3 reside in the capital city of Bogotá, followed by
Cúcuta, Barranquilla and Medellin (36). According to
the 2018 census, Bogotá and 22 close municipalities
harbor 425,120 Venezuelan migrants, a 4.8% of the
near 9 million inhabitants of the capital.
The Bogotá municipality and Migration Colombia
report that 79% of Venezuelans in the capital city live
in low socio-economic areas (Levels 2 and 3, with 6
as the highest), peripheric zones, “neighborhood of
invasion” and temporary hosting places with scarce
public services infrastructure. The dynamics is similar
to that of the internally displaced local population:
migrants can mobilize more or less constantly within
the city but also express a clear willingness and
determination to stay (29, 36, 37).
From an approximate total of 360,000 Venezuelan
migrants in Ecuador, approximately 120,000 do have
a regular residency. Quito, the capital city, Guayaquil,
Manta and Cuenca are the main localities where they
have chosen to reside, even though many of those who
have arrived recently look for smaller cities in search
of labor and housing opportunities (31).
Lima, the capital of Perú, was chosen as place
of permanent residency by 66% of the Venezuelan
migrants, according to a survey of 1,235 persons
in 2019. This is basically explained by a greater
availability of jobs, transportation and public
resources. It is understandable, on the other hand, that
more than 25% decided to stay in ve departments
North from Lima and, therefore, closer to the border
with Ecuador: La Libertad, (9.2%), Lambayeque
(4.6%), Tumbes (4.2%), Ancash. (4.2%) and Piura
(4%.). Less than the remaining 5% went to three cities
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in the South: Ica (2.3%), Arequipa. (1.3%) and Cusco
(1% ) (32). According to data from the OIM, towards
2020, an 80.6% of Venezuelan migrants were residing
in relatively deprived zones of several capital districts,
and a minority in similar areas of the neighboring port
city of Callao (38).
Age, gender and civil status
Distribution by age groups is similar in Colombia
and Venezuela. As it happens in many migratory
processes, the Venezuelan migrant population is mostly
formed by healthy, strong, capable and determined
young people; it would also seem that in the face of
risks and the uncertain fate awaiting for them, a good
number of migrants are self-selected, so that those
with more possibilities of success are, almost always,
the rst ones to leave their country.
That is why the structure of the Venezuelan migrant
population in Colombia was showing the following
characteristics around 2019:
- Twenty-six per cent were young adults between 20
and 29 years of age, a proportion greater than in the
Colombian population that had only 16.7%
occupying this rank.
- Children younger than 9 years of age constituted
23.8% of the migrant population vs. 16.7% in
Colombia; on the other hand, those older than 65
were only 1.5% among the migrants vs. 8.9%
among Colombians.
- The proportion of men compared with women was
major in the rst migrant waves but, towards 2019,
they were practically similar.
Two years later, the Quality of Life and Integration
Survey of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia,
performed by the Migra Venezuela project and
published in March of 2021 (39), showed that these
tendencies remained. The percentage of elderly people
is low and most of the migrants are active. About
gender, however, the percentage of women became
slightly higher: 51 versus 48.4% of men.
In general terms, the distribution by age groups and
gender of the Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador does
not signicantly dier from that of their compatriots
in Colombia.
In Perú, 42% of the residing Venezuelan migrants
are young adults between 18 and 29 years of age,
followed by adults (30 to 44 years) that represent
29.8% of the total. Eight percent are full adults from
45 to 59 years and 1.6%, elderly adults. Children and
adolescents represent 18.7%; from them, 7.9% belong
to the rst infancy, 6.3% are between 6 and 11 years of
age, and 4.5% are adolescents from 12 to 17 years (40,
41). About gender, 55.2% are women and 44.8%, men
(32). In turn, 51.8% are married or living together,
45.2% single, and 2.8%, widowed or divorced.
Jobs and employment
In 2018, approximately 84.2% of Venezuelan
migrants that arrived in Colombia during the preceding
ve years, were of working age; in 2019, 79.6% of
them were already laboring, even though the largest
part (53.5%) were doing it in the informal commercial
sector, restaurants, hotels and services; the remainder
were in the manufacturing industry, construction,
agriculture, transportation, and real estate agencies.
Their income levels were much lower than the
minimum salary of Colombian workers, a reason for
which it was estimated that 90% of the migrants did
not qualify for healthcare coverage (35).
Labor and employment oer in Ecuador were,
in general, similar to those in Colombia. In spite of
several measures dictated by Government oces, the
migrants do not seem to be suciently informed about
them or were not determined to take the necessary
steps.
In Perú, during the year 2020, 76.5% of Venezuelan
migrants (the majority, young people between 20 and
39 years of age) had a job, but almost 40% of them
were in precarious positions (38); they were not
adequately inserted in the work market due, in many
cases, to irregularities in their entry process and/or
subsequent lack of formal work permits. Moreover,
the fear of Peruvian workers to be substituted by the
migrants exposed the latter to being victims of eventual
rejecting behaviors (33). This resulted in a high number
of migrants involved in modest and unstable street
commercial activities (i.e., food selling) while hoping
to obtain a temporal permit of permanence (33,40).
Other lines of labor included transportation (i.e., truck
helpers), restaurant services, casinos, bakeries, fast
food chains, car washing, etc. (32, 41). Those making
a regular salary were receiving a monthly average
equivalent to U.S. $ 270 U.S.; professionals, $ 500;
business, $150, and street vendors, approximately 8 to
10 U.S. dollars daily.
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DISCUSSION
The massive, continuous and disorganized
displacement of large groups of men, women, elderly
and children, and the changes of every type that such
situation induces among the migrants themselves
and in the host communities, are of a considerable
magnitude. Intracontinental migrations such as the
VM in Latin America, are even more disturbing,
because they shake the socio-cultural and politico-
economic structure of the neighboring and, for the
same reason, similar countries, making such negative
impact much more immediately direct and devastating
(2, 41, 42). The misfortunes of a Venezuelan migrant
in Perú aect Peruvians much more than those of a
Somali migrant do to their occasional hosts in the
United States. It can be said that the migration opens
up curtains of denial or ignorance on the side of the
receiving communities vis-a-vis themselves; it creates
a “new reality” that can be, however, as old as their
own history; it generates changes and sequelae whose
evidence was only intuited before.
In the matter of Human Rights, the United Nations
Organization has adopted seven conventions that
include the elimination of every form of racial or
gender discrimination, international agreements on
civil, political, economic and socio-cultural rights,
conventions against torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading practices, protection and rights for
children, migrant workers and their families. These
declarations imply, rst, a complete registry of reliable
socio- demographic information including data about
life and work conditions, prevention of degrading and
inhuman management, freedom of thought, expression
and religious aliation, maintenance of their own
cultural values, prevention of disproportionate
punishments, among them, expulsion, and facilities
of access to education, health and social and nancial
services (43, 44).
The history and evolvement of the VM in Latin
America have original traits even though they touch
on many of the above mentioned areas (45). The
number of migrants is probably the highest in the
history of the subcontinent, and the political origin of
the process has been much more intense than the one
of previous displacements. Likewise, the processes
of acculturation, educational and labor adaptation
and social integration have been more painful than
those expected among populations, communities
or countries with a common historical origin; lastly,
their current status and their outcome are even more
uncertain, when not conictive or costly, in economic
and, essentially, in the human terms of the so-called
“social capital” (46, 47).
For a profound study of these themes and their
eventual impact on the individual and collective
mental health, it is indispensable to examine in detail
the process and the journey, as well as basic socio-
demographic, occupational and economic information.
Every migration implies a series of processes that put
to a test the convictions, decision-making capabilities,
temperamental traits, and moral principles of all
participants. These perspectives will also focus on two
additional points to be matter if further publications by
this group: the impact of COVID-19 on the Venezuelan
migrants and the particular experience of women
migrants having their strengths and vulnerabilities
confronted by the displacement process.
CONCLUSIONS
The Venezuelan Migration to Latin American
countries is probably one of the social phenomena of
the greatest impact in the continent since, at least, the
second half of the last century. The complex variety
of circumstances, amalgamated in a socio-political
and economic reality unsustainable for millions
of Venezuelans, resulted in their decision and the
onset of a massive migration towards mainly three
Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Perú).
The impact of this process in the migrant population
as well as in the host communities has been intense
and multiform. It has put to a test personal, family
and group strategies of adaptation and resilience, as
well as levels of tolerance, possibilities of empathy
and acceptance, potential and/or declared forms of
rejection or discrimination, and national systems of
medical attention, physical and mental health, and
social coexistence. A clear description of the socio-
demographic characteristics of the migrant population
oers not only substantial basis for an analysis of
this process and its impact on the mental health of
the aected communities, but also a constructive
approach to the future, based on the reinforcement of
the socio- cultural integration of the continent, and on
cogent policies of reception, acceptance, solidarity
and preservation of inalienable principles and rights.
Correspondence:
Renato D. Alarcón.
Av. Camino Real No. 961, Dpto. 2402, San Isidro,
Lima 18, Perú.
E-mail: [email protected]
114
Alarcón R, et al.
Rev Neuropsiquiatr. 2022; 85(2): 107-116
Authors’ contributions: RDA and EV conceived
the original idea of the study and designed the plan
of systematic search of pertinent information. All
the authors participated in the search of articles and
documents carrying research data of their original
countries. RDA and AL wrote the preliminary
manuscript version whose nal text was revised and
approved by all the authors. Likewise, all assume
responsibility for the article’s content.
Financial sources: There have not been nancial
sources for the study.
Conicts of interest: The authors declare not to
have conicts of interest.
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Recibido: 07/02/2022
Aceptado: 25/04/2022
